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Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of
Delegates to Presidential Nominating Conventions
The presidential election year of 1968 produced a spate of deep-felt
dissatisfaction with the current method of nominating and electing our
President. The two major parties were both rocked with dissension;'
there was a strong third-party movement which wound up with more
than 10% of the popular vote; and there was a threat of the formation
of a fourth party. The George Wallace faction in particular, by nearly
preventing either of the major party candidates from gaining a ma-
jority of the electoral vote, has stimulated widespread efforts at reform-
ing the presidential election process. This activity has focused both on
the Electoral College2 and on the various systems by which state parties
select delegates to the national party conventions.3
Both major parties have set up committees to study the method of
selecting presidential nominees. The impetus for the establishment of
these committees came largely from an internal challenge to the cur-
rent procedures for delegate selection in the Democratic Party. Pro-
McCarthy members of the Rules and Credentials committees of the
1968 Democratic National Convention set up a group-the Commis-
sion on the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees (the Hughes
Commission)-to study the convention and the delegate selection pro-
cess.4 The conclusion of the Hughes Commission was that
state systems for selecting delegates to the National Convention
and the procedures of the Convention itself, display considerably
1. E.g., there were some 19 credentials challenges at the 1968 Democratic National
Convention; similar pitched battles were fought in the Rules Committee (abolition of the
unit rule to the precinct level) and the Platform Committee (Vietnam War plank). See
generally Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials Contests at the 1968-and 1972-Democratic
National Conventions, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1438 (1969).
2. For example, Senator Birch Bayh has called for the elimination of the Electoral
College and the substitution of direct election of the President by popular vote. Other
plans for reform include district election of electors and proportional allocation of a
state's electoral vote. See A. BIeEL, THE NEw AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM 53-73 (1968).
3. Senators Margaret Chase Smith and George Aiken have proposed doing away with
the national party nominating conventions and substituting, a national primary. Id. at
74. Representative Bob Eckhardt (D-Tex.) has proposed a bill to encourage states volun-
tarily to adopt uniform legislation for delegate selection. See State Delegates to National
Political Conventions (memorandum from the American Law Division, Legislative Re-
ference Service, to Hon. Bob Eckhardt, Aug. 19, 1968).
4. The report of the Hughes Commission, THE DEMOCRATIC CHOICE fIhereinafter cited
as HuGHES COMMISSION], was completed just prior to the 1968 Democratic National Con-
vention.
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less fidelity to basic democratic principles than a nation which
claims to govern itself can safely tolerate....
...National parties... are media which any segment of the
population can use every four years to express its view, to vindi-
cate its interests, and to change policies. But if existing parties
fail to perform this function, they will not survive.6
At the convention, a minority plank abolishing the unit rule down
to the precinct level was adopted as a result of the Hughes Commission
findings.
The Democratic National Committee subsequently formed a com-
mittee, under Senator George McGovern, to continue the study of the
delegate selection process and to make further recommendations for
change. Republican National Committee Chairman Rogers Morton
established a counterpart committee, and the two major parties then
decided to cooperate in a bi-partisan effort at reform of the presidential
nominating process.6
In the face of barriers preventing them from effectively influencing
the composition of the ballot, both the third party Wallace supporters
and the Democratic and Republican intra-party dissidents turned to
the courts. Wallace backers challenged the Ohio obstacles to placing
new parties on the ballot;7 dissidents within the major parties at-
tempted to have the courts apply constitutional safeguards to the dele-
gate selection process.8 The interest which the courts were asked to
protect in both types of cases is the same-full and effective participa-
tion in determining the composition of the presidential ballot. Like
the blacks in the White Primary Cases0 the political minorities sought
judicial recognition of a constitutional right to participation in the
nominating process. And as in the Reapportionment Cases,"' the courts
5. HUGHES Co~nnssioN 2, 15-16.
6. There is some evidence, however, that the cooperative effort is serving not to
faclitate but to thwart further change. See R. Evans & R. Novak, Re.formed Reform, N.Y.
Post, April 19, 1969, at 26, col. 3-4. Regardless of the outcome of the reform movement,
delegate selection procedures will likely be challenged even more vigorously before the
1972 conventions, and courts will continue to be faced with the issues discussed in this
Note.
7. Williams v. Rhodes, 593 U.S. 23 (1868). This case is discussed at pp. 1249-52 infra.
8. Smith v. State Democratic Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.. Ga. 1968) (see
note 25 infra); Irish v. Democratic Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1958)
(see note 59 infra); Dahl v. Republican State Comm., Civil No. 7557 (WI.D. Wash. 1968).
vacated, 593 U.S. 408 (1969) (see note 61 infra).
9. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allright, 321 US. 619 (1944);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Baskin
v. Brown, 174 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
10. Avery v. Midland County, 290 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 268 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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were asked to step into the "political thicket" to protect the interests
of those voters who had their votes "diluted" by political structures
designed to favor particular interest groups. While the third party
advocates have twice been successful in attacking state restrictions on
access to the ballot,"' the courts have thus far refused to intervene in
the major party delegate selection process. This Note argues that the
latter cases were incorrectly decided, and that the fourteenth amend-
ment protects the right of all party members to participate-on an
equal basis-in the choice of the presidential nominee of their party.
Before discussing the substance of the constitutional claim, however,
it is necessary to deal with three possible obstacles to judicial involve-
ment.
I.
Issues presented for resolution by the courts must be "justiciable."'
12
The decisions of the Supreme Court in the Reapportionment Cases'
5
indicate that, in spite of its highly political nature, the area of con-
vention delegate selection is within the regulatory power of the federal
courts. Prior to Baker v. Carr,14 Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion
in Colegrove v. Green', would have barred any claim that delegate
selection procedures violate constitutional guarantees. The opinion of
the Court in Colegrove emphasized the "peculiarly political" nature of
apportionment decisions and in effect stated that claims involving the
structure of representative institutions were not justiciable.16 In Baker,
11. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US. 23 (1968); Moore v. Ogilvie, 894 U.S. 814 (1969).
12. These are the elements of justiciability under the "political question" doctrine
as articulated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962):
(1) Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of thc issue to a coordinate
political Department;
(2) or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
(3) or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind dearly for nonjudicial discretion;
(4) or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of the government;
(5) or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made;
(6) or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
13. Note I0 supra.
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. 328 US. 549 (1946). Justices Reed and Burton joined Justice Frankfurter in
Colegrove. The fourth member of the majority was Justice Rutledge, who concurred
on the basis of his view that the Court had power to decide the issue but should refrain
from exercising it on policy grounds. Id. at 564. Justice Black, joined by Justices Doug-
las and Murphy, dissented; two justices did not sit in the case.
16. Justice Frankfurter said the political question doctrine excluded the entire ap-
portionment area from judicial action:
The basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as
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however, the Court rejected the notion that any broad class of issues
was by its very nature nonjusticiable, and outlined an ad hoc approach
to "political questions" based in large part on the availability of stan-
dards for judicial decision. Under this test, claims defined in terms of
the Guaranty Clause 7 were found to be non-justiciable, but claims of
deprivation of personal political rights might be heard since "[]udicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and
familiar . "..",18
Insofar as particular delegate selection procedures have a direct im-
pact on the individual's ability to participate effectively in the political
process, they raise issues of personal political rights under the four-
teenth amendment. The electoral procedures involved are analogous
to those regulated by the courts in the Reapportionment Cases, and it
would seem that the questions raised are no less susceptible to treat-
ment through "well developed and familiar" judicial standards.10
A second possible obstacle to judicial involvement in delegate selec-
tion procedures is the argument that courts lack jurisdiction to hear
such cases. The Court in Baker was careful to distinguish the issue of
jurisdiction of the subject matter from that of justiciability of the
claim. The federal courts can exercise jurisdiction only by a specific
statutory grant of power, or in matters constitutionally conferred. In
Baker, the Court found jurisdiction in that a claimed denial of equal
apportionment of representatives to the state legislature "does arise
under the Constitution." In New York State Association of Trial
Lawyers v. Rockefeller,20 on the other hand, the district court held
that there was no federally protected right to have state court judges
a polity... . Nothing is dearer than that this controversy concerns matters that
bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. . . . It is
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.
And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially political
contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law.
328 U.S. at 552-54. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Justice Frankfurter in dissent
noted that the reason for nonjusticiability was that courts are not fit instruments for
decision where the issue is a large contest of policy traditionally resolved in non-judicial
forums:
What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among competing
bases of representation-ultimately, really among competing theories of political
philosophy-in order to establish an appropriate frame of government for the State
of Tennessee and thereby for all the States of the Union.
Id. at 300.
17. U.S. CONSr., art. IV, sec. 4.
18. Claims of "political question" have recently met with notable lack of success.
In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US. 23 (1968), Justice Black made short shrift of the non-
justiciability argument, dismissing it almost in passing. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 37
U.S.L.W. 4549 (US. June 16, 1969).
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186, 226 (1962).
20. 267 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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apportioned throughout the state so as to equalize court calendar
waiting lists, and therefore no federal jurisdiction of the claim. Justice
Harlan used the same approach in his dissent in Baker;21 his position
was that until the Court decided whether the fourteenth amendment
imposed some restraint on apportionment of state legislatures, there
could be no federal jurisdiction.
In cases where the plaintiff argues that he is asserting "a claim under
the constitution," it is of course impossible to establish jurisdiction
without a prior consideration of whether the asserted constitutional
right exists. If the Court denies jurisdiction, it has in effect decided
on the merits that there is no constitutional right which can be asserted
on the allegations in question.22 This Note will attempt to show that
there is a constitutionally cognizable interest involved in claims by
major party members to equal participation in the presidential nom-
ination process. If a court should reject this argument, it should meet
the substantive issues raised and not resort to "verbal fencing about
'jurisdiction.' "23
A third possible obstacle to the application of fourteenth amend-
ment standards to party presidential nominating procedures is the
requirement that there be a showing of state action before rights as-
serted under the fourteenth amendment can be protected. It is ques-
tionable whether in the current state of the doctrine the notion of state
action has any analytic usefulness at all. As Professor Charles Black
puts it: "The field is a conceptual disaster area; most constructive
suggestions come down ... to the suggestion that attention shift from
the inquiry after "state action" to some other inquiry altogether."24
Nonetheless, judicial opinions continue to devote considerable space
to the matter, and in Smith v. State Democratic Executive Committee25
21. 369 U.S. 186, 332 (1962).
22. See DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION ch. VI (1968).
23. But see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-33 (1962).
24. Black, The Supreme Court-Foreward, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). See also
Note, Strange Career of State Action Under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J.
1448 (1965).
25. 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968). Georgia law, at issue in Smith, places the
party state executive committee in charge of selecting delegates to the national conven-
tion. Rule 55 of the Georgia Democratic Party gives the chairman of the state executive
committee power to select all national convention delegates with the advice and consent
of the Democratic gubernatorial nominee. The State Committee is composed of 200
members, 100 of whom are chosen by the Chairman, who in turn is chosen by the guber-
natorial nominee. In addition, there is a quadrennial convention of the party following
each gubernatorial election. Party rules designate as delegates members of the state ex-
ecutive committee and local county executive committees, and "such other delegates as
may be designated by the Democratic Gubernatorial nominee." (Rule 53.) Since the
governor had designated all party members as delegates, the Court found that there had
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a United States district court went so far as to reject a constitutional
challenge to the delegate selection procedure of the Georgia Demo-
cratic Party on the ground that there had been an insufficient showing
of state involvement. It therefore seems appropriate to discuss the sub-
ject briefly here.
Fifteen of the 51 electoral constituencies select their delegates to the
national convention in whole or in part by party primary election.20
Whether or not these primaries are organized or regulated by the
state, there can be little doubt that the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment apply. Nixon v. Herndon,- Nixon v. Condon!-s and Smith
v. Allwright29 are typical of the cases in which the Court has found
sufficient state involvement in party affairs so that fourteenth and
fifteenth amendment guarantees apply to party membership qualifica.
been an open convention and thus, even if state action were present, there was no vio-
lation of equal protection.
26. The figure of fifteen does not include Alabama, where a primary is optional at
the discretion of the state executive committee, provided that the party has gained more
than 20% of the vote at the general election for state officers; or Arkansas, where a pri-
mary is optional and can be petitioned for no later than six months before the national
convention. US. SENATE, NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF TIM PRESIDENT AND VICE PnRSIDExr
OF THE UNiTEr STATES 65, 69-70 (1968). While Indiana's preferential poll is binding on
the delegates by statute for the first ballot, the delegates are selected at a state party
convention and thus not included in the above figure of fifteen. Id. at 92-95. The fifty.
first constituency is the District of Columbia, which receives three electoral votes. U.S.
CONsr., amend. XXIII.
27. 273 US. 536 (1927). The Court invalidated a Texas statute which expressly denied
to blacks the right to vote in the Democratic Party primary. Justice Holmes said that
it was "unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment" as it was "hard to imagine a
more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth." Id. at 541.
28. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). The Texas statute under challenge in Condon granted power
to the party through its executive committee to prescribe qualifications for party mem-
bership and the right to vote in the primary. The executive committee of the Democratic
Party barred blacks from participation in the primary, and the Court invalidated the
regulation. Justice Cardozo for the Court held that the inherent power of a party to
choose its members lay with the state convention. The statutory conferral of this au-
thority upon the executive committee was sufficient state involvement to trigger the
appropriate constitutional restraints.
29. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). After the decision in Nixon v. Condon, 286 US. 73 (1932),
the Texas Democratic Party decided to exclude blacks by a resolution of the state con-
vention which, according to the Court in Condon, had the inherent power to set quali-
fications for participation in the primary. In Grovey v. Tovnsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), the
Court unanimously upheld the new restrictions imposed by the Texas Democratic Party.
The doctrine of Grovey, however, was specifically overruled nine years later in All-
wright where the Court admitted that while the privilege of membership in a political
party alone might not be a concern of the state, yet "when ... that privilege is also
the essential qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general elec-
tion, the State makes the action of the party the action of the State.' 321 U.S. at 664-65.
Although Allwright was decided on fifteenth amendment grounds because racial dis-
crimination was involved, the criteria for a finding of state action should be the same
in a voting rights case under the fourteenth amendment. Once the primary is viewed
as part of the electoral process, it is state action to which both the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments equally apply. "[Tihe recognition of the place of the primary in
the electoral scheme makes dear that state delegation to a part), of the power to fix the
qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the
party's action the action of the State." Id. at 660.
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tions. In Allwright, the Court also held that the holding of primary
elections is essentially a state function, an integral part of the proce-
dure for selecting public officials, and that the requisite state action
is therefore present even when the state had delegated control to a
political party. While the case involved a situation in which winning
the Democratic nomination for an office was tantamount to election,
the holding of primaries would appear to be no less a state function in
two-party states.80
From the point of view of state action, the case in which delegates
are selected at a state convention which is itself elected by party mem-
bers is indistinguishable from that of primaries. In both situations,
the state has delegated to a political party the function of setting up
an electoral process for nominating candidates. A1lwright is therefore
clearly applicable.
Where state delegates to the national convention are selected by local
party officials, by the governor, or by some other means not involving
direct participation by the party rank and file, state action is also
present. If the state participates directly in the holding of the conven-
tion, A llwright is controlling. Where the selection process is left wholly
in the hands of the party, the "state function" notion as extended in
Terry v. Adams31 is applicable.3 2 In Terry, the Court held that blacks
30. Most commentators seem to agree that in a constitutional democracy, party nomi-
nation is perhaps the most important factor in determining how voters will cast their
ballots. See A. LAKEMAN & B. LAMBERT, VOTING IN DEMOCRACIES 31 (1960); G. DUVERGER,
PoLrrIcAL PARTiES 353 (1955); N. POsBY :& A. WIWAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELErCIONS 9 (1968).
This is true even where there is active party competition. See United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941):
The right of participation is protected just as is the right to vote at the election,
where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery, whether
the voter exercises his right in a party primary which invariably, sometimes or never
determines the ultimate choice of the representative.
Cf. the dissent of Justice Douglas in MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 288 (1948), where
the Court refused to strike down Illinois' statute requiring 200 signatures from at least
50 counties in order to qualify for a place on the ballot:
The protection which the Constitution gives voting rights covers not only the general
election but also extends to every integral part of the electoral process, including pri-
maries . . . .When candidates are chosen for the general election by a nominating
petition, that procedure also becomes an integral part of the electoral process. It is
entitled to the same protection as that which the Fourteenth Amendment grants any
other part.
MacDougall was overruled by the recent case of Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969),
in an opinion written by Justice Douglas.
31. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
32. Cl. Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965). In Lynch, a functional ap.
proach was used in determining the applicability of the equal protection clause to
internal party procedures. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the election of a county
chairman whose function the court found to be primarily the internal management of
party affairs. While acknowledging that one man, one vote applies to both state-regulatcd
and party-conducted primaries, the court said that "this is because the function of pri-
maries is to select nominees for government office even though, not because, they are
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could not be excluded from a "pre-primary" held by a "self-governing
club" which effectively controlled Democratic Party nominations in
the county, even though the club was ostensibly completely inde-
pendent of both the party and the state government. The case estab-
lished that the holding of a formal primary under state or even party
auspices is not a prerequisite for a finding of state action under the
state function theory. Justice Black's opinion went so far as to suggest
an affirmative state duty to ensure that none of its citizens were denied
their fourteenth and fifteenth amendment rights to participate in the
nomination process.m
Rice v. Elmore,3 4 a Fourth Circuit case explicitly endorsed by Justice
Black in Terry, neatly states the modem view of the relationship be-
tween party and state:
The party may, indeed, have been a mere private aggregation of
individuals in the early days of the Republic, but with the passage
of the years, political parties have become in effect state institu-
tions, governmental agencies through which sovereign power is
exercised by the people.35
party enterprises." Id. at 372. Since a governmental function was not involved in all
e activities of the county chairman, the court refused the injunction while leaving
open the possibility of future suits on particular violations.
It is also interesting to note that the court, in a footnote, observed that "[i]ndeed,
choice of delegates to party national conventions for the nomination of candidates for
President and Vice President would seem logically to be covered by plaintiff's view of
the reach of the equal protection clause." Id. n.5.
The district court opinion of Judge Dumbault, 228 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Pa. 1964), is an
amusing reminiscence by a one-time Democratic County Chairman. See also Bentman v.
Seventh Ward Democratic Executive Comm., 421 Pa. 188, 218 A.2d 261 (1966).
33. Justices Douglas and Burton joined with Justice Black in his opinion. justice
Frankfurter found state action in the participation by county election officials in the
discriminatory Jaybird primary. 345 U.S. 461, 475-76 (1953). Justice Clark, joined by
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Jackson and Reed, found that blacks had been excluded
from the electoral process
at the sole stage of the local political process where the bargaining and interplay of
rival political forces would make it count .... Whether viewed as a separate political
organization or as an adjunct of the local Democratic Party, the Jaybird Democratic
Association is the decisive power in the county's recognized electoral process. Over
the years its balloting has emerged as the locus of effective political choice.
Id. at 484.
34. 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947). South Carolina had repealed all its primary laws in
order to escape the holding of A1wright. The Court noted that the primary, whether
with or without state participation, "fulfilled the same function in the election machinery
of the state." Id. at 388. The delegation by the state of part of its election machinery
was no bar to safeguarding the rights of the disenfranchised blacks. When party officials
participate in what is a part of the state's machinery, they are election officers of the
state de facto, if not de jure, and as such must observe the limitations of the Con-
stitution. Having undertaken to perform an important function relating to the cxercime
of sovereignty by the people, they may not violate the fundamental principles laid
down in the Constitution for its exercise. Id. at 391,
35. 165 IY.2d at 89.
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II.
If it be conceded that neither political question doctrine nor state
action theory poses a serious obstacle to judicial involvement in the
delegate selection process, it remains to determine the doctrinal frame-
work for the consideration of claims by party members that they have
been denied effective participation in the selection of national conven-
tion delegates. The Reapportionment Cases," which dealt with ba-
sically similar questions of fair representation in the electoral process,
suggest that equal protection is the appropriate criterion. 7
In litigation under the equal protection clause, the predominant
concern is whether
36. Note 10 supra.
37. Issues concerning the allotment of convention delegates among the states are
beyond the scope of this Note. The legitimacy of the convention structures is assumed
herein, but this assumption does not relieve each state from conformity to equal pro-
tection standards of one man, one vote in selecting its delegates to the national con-
vention. The Supreme Court in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), and again in Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), specifically rejected the argument that the model of dis-
proportionate voting power in the Electoral College and in the United States Senate legit-
imates all other apportionment schemes not based solely on population. While the U.S.
House of Representatives may allot a disproportionate number of seats to the less pop-
ulous states, the states are not thereby relieved from any duty to follow the one man,
one vote principle in selection of their representatives to the House. Similarly, the mem.
bership in the Senate is not based on population; it should be clear, however, that no
state could elect its Senators from districts of unequal population. Therefore, the fact
that delegate allotment might be based in part on factors other than population does
not of itself imply that state delegations need not follow the one man, one vote standard.
The analysis herein would hardly be complete, however, without a brief description
of the allocation of delegate votes at the major party conventions. The Democrats award
three delegates for each Electoral College vote; one delegate for each 100,000 popular
votes cast in a state for the previous Democratic presidential nominee, with a minimum
of one per state; one vote for each member of the Democratic National Committee (i.e.,
two delegates per state); and a ten delegate bonus for a state which went Democratic in
the last presidential election.
The Republicans award four delegates per state; a six delegate bonus if a state went
Republican in the last presidential election or if it since has elected a Republican
U.S. Senator or Governor; one delegate from each congressional district where the last
Republican presidential nominee or congressional nominee got 2,000 votes, and one
additional delegate if he received more than 10,000 votes; and two delegates for each
representative elected at-large in a state.
The Hughes Commission discerned four objectives in the Democratic formula of ap.
portioning delegates:
(I) one man, one vote;
(2) one Democrat, one vote;
(3) equal represenation for states;
(4) reward for victory.
The Commission recommended that the last two objectives be deemphasized in Im-
portance, specifically by eliminating the flat grant of a 10-vote bonus for carrying tile
state. HuGims COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 62-63.
The Republican formula places even greater emphasis on equal representation of
states. The one Republican, one vote principle is truncated by the limitation that no
additional delegates are awarded to congressional districts with over 10,000 Republican
votes. The four at-large delegates per state represent twice the allotment by the Demo.
cratic formula, but four times the voting power, since the Republicans grant only half
as many delegate votes as the Democrats.
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the rights allegedly impaired are individual and personal in
nature.... While the result of a court decision . . . may be to
require the restructuring of the geographical distribution of seats
in a state legislature, the judicial focus must be concentrated upon
ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination against
certain of the State's citizens which constitutes an impermissible
impairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote.38
While the character of the interest involved and the deprivation to
be remedied may be personal in nature, some commentators have
argued that "the basic issue . . . is what kind of representation pro-
cesses and institutions are required to assure a government that rests
upon the will of the people."3 9 The application of equal protection
standards to apportionment admittedly has an impact on the political
process as a whole. The rigid mathematical formula which has resulted
from the equal protection approach excludes these political conse-
quences from consideration. Therefore, critics of the Court's approach
have argued that if the Court is to enter the area at all, it should adopt
a substantive due process analysis which permits examination of the
broader issues involved.
The Court's hesitancy to use substantive due process is understand-
able. It is one thing to enter the political arena to enforce a simple
ground rule whose violation can be more or less objectively deter-
mined. 0 It is quite another to take responsibility for evaluating the
over-all democratic quality of political institutions. To be sure, the
38. Reynolds v. Sims, 337 US. 533, 561 (1964). In Re ,nolds the Court acknowledged
that it was "determining the basic standards and stating the applicable guidelines for
implementing our discussion in Balzer v. Carr." Id. at 599. It is worthy of note, how-
ever, that the Court hesitated in formulating one man, one vote as the appropriate stan-
dard of equal protection in the Reapportionment Cases. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1 (1964), a case involving apportionment of congressional districts, the Court evaded
the problem of enunciating the requirements of equal protection by construing Article
I, section 2 of the Constitution, which requires that Representatives be chosen "by the
people of the several states," to mean one man, one vote. 376 U.S. at 7-8.
39. Kauper, Some Comments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 Mici. L. REv. 243,
248 (1964). See DIXON, DsiocRA ic REPP.ESENTATION 136 (1968):
The republican guarantee clause would dictate a constitutional litigation focus en-
compassing necessarily a concern for representation results. The due process clause
through its stress on ground rules of substantive reasonableness would yield the same
breadth of focus. By contrast, grounding apportionment litigation on the equal
protection clause tended to lead to a near-exclusive focus not on representation re-
sults and not on considerations of equal treatment of voter-plaintiffs, but rather on
concern simply for equality in the total population masses encompassed in legisla-
tive districts-a concern in short for physical form and not for political substance.
Cf. Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican
Government, 50 CP.UF. L. REV. 245, 257 (1962).
40. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). The most recent cases indi-
cate the Court's exclusive reliance on a mathematical formula. See, e.g., Wells Y. Rocke-
feller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 US. 526 (1969); Swann v. Adams,
385 U.S. 440 (1967).
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decision to intervene in apportionment cases at all involved the Su-
preme Court in an inquiry into the "theoretic base of representa-
tion,"4 1 but once the one man, one vote standard was adopted it had
the advantage of easy administrative applicability without further re-
sort to fundamental principles. The due process approach, on the other
hand, does not lend itself as well to easily administered rules; the
Court would have become involved in weighing political claims in each
case it decided, a delicate enteprise for a Court under steady attack for
its activist interpretation of the judicial role.
III.
In states where national convention delegates are selected through
a primary, the application of equal protection standards is relatively
straightforward. Since there is a clear commitment to popular partici-
pation in the nominating process, the state must guarantee one man,
one vote.42 In Gray v. Sanders,43 the Court struck down the Georgia
county unit system of tabulating votes in state-wide primaries for U.S.
Senator, governor, and other state officials. Under the Georgia proce-
dure the winner of the popular vote in each county received all the
county's units, and the candidate with the largest number of units won
41. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Baker v. Carr, makes this point:
Indeed, since "equal protection of the laws" can only mean an equality of persons
standing in the same relation to whatever governmental action is challenged, the de-
termination whether treatment is equal presupposes a determination concerning the
nature of the relationship. This, with respect to apportionment, means an inquiry
into the theoretic base of representation in an acceptable republican state. For a
Court could not determine the equal-protection issue without in fact first determin-
ing the Republican-Form issue, simply because what is reasonable for equal protec-
tion purposes will depend upon what frame of government, basically, is allowed.
To divorce "equal protection" from "Republican Form" is to talk about half a
question.
369 U.S. at 301.
42. The one man, one vote standard in the case of legislative reapportionment re-
quires that single-member districts be of equal population. Where the issue involves
equality of voting power in party primaries, however, the gross population measure may
be inadequate. The relevant population for determining one man, one vote guidelines
in delegate selection would seem to be party membership. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368, 381 (1963).
There are at least two measures of party membership which might be used: party
registration, or votes for the party in some past election. Registration figures have the
appeal of being current, flexible, and responsive to effective political organization, On
the other hand, it might be argued that a local area should be represented in accordance
with how it actually cast its vote at some prior election. This criterion would give local
party organizations more incentive to work for a party nominee whom they did not sup-
port prior to the convention, and might enhance the effectiveness of parties as coalition-
forgers by allowing a penalty to local organizations for disloyalty on election (lay. Issues
of this type have arisen in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966), and Rogers v.
State Committee of the Republican Party, 96 NJ. Super. 265 (1967).
43. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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the nomination. The Court held that even where the total number
of units was distributed among counties according to their population,
the system was unconstitutional since it resulted in the disenfranchise-
ment at the locus of effective decision-making of the minority voters
of each county, thereby making it possible for a candidate with less
than a plurality of the total popular vote to win a plurality of county
units and hence the nomination.
44
Gray is applicable to methods wherein a national convention dele-
gate slate is selected, in a technique similar to the county unit system,
by electors chosen in district primaries. Any structuring of these pri-
maries which permits a candidate to receive the state's delegates with
less than a plurality of the statewide popular vote is a violation of
equal protection.
45
44. Id. at 381 n.12:
The county unit system . . . would allow the candidate winning the popular vote
in the county to have the entire unit vote of that county. Hence, the weighting of
votes would continue, even if unit votes were allocated strictly in proportion to popula-
tion. Thus if a candidate won 6,000 of 10,000 votes in a particular county, he would
get the entire unit vote, the 4,000 votes for a different candidate being worth nothing
and being counted only for the purpose of being discarded.
It was on this issue that the Supreme Court disagreed with the district court. Even
though the district court enjoined the use of the county unit system as it then operated,
the Supreme Court remanded for a broader decree barring use of the county unit
system under all circumstances. See 372 U.S. at 373.
45. The Court in Gray explicitly refused to consider whether the constitutional test
it used to strike down the county unit system would also apply to a nominating conven-
tion. 372 U.S. at 378 n.10. The Court did state, however, that in a primary, voters within
a geographic unit had a constitutionally protected interest in having their votes counted
in the final decision-making forum where the gubernatorial nominee was chosen. 372
U.S. at 379. This reasoning would seem to cast doubt upon the constitutional validity of
a nominating system where delegate slates are elected from geographical units on an
at-large, winner-take-all basis, and might also make suspect other delegate selection
procedures. The minimum which Gray should require is outlined in the text; its broader
implications are discussed herein.
The presidential nominating convention is a deliberative body, and distinguishable
on that basis from the vote-counting system struck down in Gray. If the Gray rationale
were extended mechanically to deliberative nominating bodies-i.e., functional equiv-
alents of the primary-it might seem that the same rationale could be applied to in-
validate single-member constituencies in state legislatures, for the votes of those who
favor a losing candidate in a district are "wasted"-not represented-at the decision-
making stage in the legislative process. Such a result, carried to its logical conclusion,
would seem to require strict proportional representation in every legislative body.
However, while the interest in full and effective participation by political minorities
must be deemed fundamental, a state may, for compelling and constitutionally permis-
sible reasons, give less than full protection to this interest. In the case of state legislatures,
there are strong interests in favor of single-member districts which counterbalance the
interests of political minorities in substantially proportional representation. First, the
function of a legislature is to govern, not to make only a single decision. The makeup of
majorities within each district may shift on every issue before the legislature, and no
system of selecting a legislator can assure that he will carry out the ishes only of those
who voted for him. In addition, a legislator serves his constituents in ways other than
voting, and it is not accurate to say that the voters for the losing candidate are effec-
tively unrepresented.
The second strong state interest in single-member constituencies is the promotion of
the two-party system. While Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (196S), limits the extent
to which a state may justify its statutory voting regulations by referring to the interest
in two-party government, it seems to indicate that there is such a constitutionally rec-
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Where a state's national convention delegates are elected on a dis-
trict basis, Reynold v. Sims 46 is applicable. In that case the Court held
that unless the districts electing representatives to both houses of the
state legislature are apportioned substantially on a population basis,
the voters in the more populous districts are denied equal protection.
The analogy to representation in the state delegation to the national
convention is direct. In each case, the interest of the individual voter
is that his vote count for as much as that of any other voter.47 If a party
member's elected representative on the state delegation to the national
convention comes from a disproportionately large district, then the
party member's ability to influence the state delegation's action at
the convention has been "diluted," and he has been denied equal
protection of the law.
Where the state's delegates to the national convention are selected
at a state convention, or by appointment, it is best to distinguish
"open" structures, where all party members are allowed to participate
in the selection of representatives to the state convention or in the
selection of the body responsible for delegate appointment, from
"closed" structures, where there is no provision for direct participation
by the party rank-and-file. If the state provides for an open state con-
ognizable interest. Cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). Single-member legislative districts,
themselves an attempt to assure a degree of minority representation, would therefore
seem to be a justifiable deviation from a standard of strict proportional representation.
The case of a nominating convention is much closer to that of the county unit system
in Gray than to that of a state legislature. Although convention delegates often per.
form deliberative functions in that they are not generally bound to vote on every ballot
for a previously endorsed candidate, they are selected for one primary purpose-the
nomination of a presidential candidate-on which the electorate can express a clear
choice. Moreover, the interest in the stability of the two-party system may be promoted
rather than threatened by a convention system which assures representation to minorities
within the parties in each state. Substantially proportional representation of intra-party
minorities is likely to encourage the use of internal party procedures for the resolution of
conflicts, and hence to reduce the motivation for the formation of new parties.
State at-large, winner-take-all slate primaries, like that of California, would seem,
therefore, to have the proscribed defects of the county unit system in Gray, without
the strong justifications for single-member legislative districts. To invalidate these
primaries as a denial of equal protection would be a relatively small step from Gray.
The extent to which the Gray doctrine is used to invalidate other procedures which fall
short of full proportional representation should depend upon the extent to which those
other procedures ensure adequate minority representation at the national convention.
It seems best that the Court adopt the "go-slow" approach it used in Baker v. Carr and
Williams v. Rhodes, striking down clearly abusive practices without at first enunciating
a precise, mandatory rule for national major party delegate selection.
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
47. Reynolds established that "the fundamental principle of representative govern-
ment in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people." Id.
at 560-61. Having set up numerical equality of voters as a presumptive requirement,
the Court then seeks in specific cases "to ascertain . .. whether there are any con-
stitutionally cognizable principles which would justify departures" from this standard.
Id. at 561. Cf. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 72-73 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting);
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1967).
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vention with the delegates elected directly at the precinct or other
local level, the analogy to Reynolds v. Sims should require that local
districts be of equal population. However, where the procedures for
selection of delegates to the state convention involve several stages,
equal protection standards become less clear.
While Gray v. Sanders held that the state could not superimpose a
county unit system on the outcome of the popular vote in a state pri-
mary, the later case of Fortson v. Morris48 seems to limit the principle
of full popular control. In Fortson, the Court upheld a provision of
the Georgia constitution which gave the state legislature the power to
elect the governor when none of the candidates in the popular election
received a majority of the vote. The Fortson majority treated the
election by the legislature as a separate, alternative process under
Georgia law, and therefore found no problem with the fact that the
legislature's choice, Lester Maddox, had placed second in the popular
vote.49 The Court asserted that since the state could provide for elec-
tion of the governor exclusively by the legislature, it could also employ
that procedure as an alternative to the popular vote in the event no
candidate received a majority.50 Gray was held inapposite since nothing
48. 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
49. There are two observations about the case which deserve mention. First. there
were strong political reasons for not overturning the Georgia legilatures choice of
Lester Maddox. Fortson was argued on December 5, 1966; on that same day, the Court
held that the Georgia legislature had violated the first amendment rights of Julian
Bond in disqualifying him from membership. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). The
Court's decision in Fortson was announced just one week later, on December 12, 1966,
and its political impact was lost on no one.
Second, the Court adopted a curious construction of the facts of the case to fit its
decision within Gray. The Fortson majority (it was a 5-4 decision) felt that it did not
have to make a determination of when an election is constitutionally compelled, for it
could distinguish Gray, which involved a primary, on the grounds of a state commitment
to popular participation. That this distinction is strained was pointed out by Justice
Douglas in dissent:
The Court misstates the question we must decide. It is not whether Georgia may
select a Governor through a legislative election. It is whether the legislature may
make the final choice when the election has been entrusted to the people and
no candidate has received a majority of the votes. In other words, the legislative
choice is only a part of the popular election machinery.. . . It is said that the
general election is over and that a new, and different, alternative procedure is now
about to be used. But that is belied by the realities .... The election, commencing
with the primary, will indeed not be finally completed until the winner has taken
the oath of office.
Id. at 238. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 US. 461, 476 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. Justice Fortas in his dissent in Fortson went beyond the objection of Justice
Douglas that the majority had adopted a disingenuous interpretation of the facts.
Justice Fortas attacked the assumption of the majority that a state could withdraw
the office of governor from popular election, 385 U.S. at 24647, and would have de.
manded strict adherence to the popular election method:
If the vote cast by all of those who favor a particular candidate exceeds the number
cast in favor of a rival, the result is constitutionally protected as a matter of equal
protection of the laws from nullification except by the voters themselves. The candi.
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in that case "indicated that it was intended to compel a state to elect
its governors ... through elections of the people rather than through
selections by appointment or elections by the State Assembly."5 Fort-
son thus placed a limitation on Gray: before the one man, one vote
rule is applicable, there must be a showing of a commitment to popular
election as the exclusive means of selecting the official.
A second restriction on Gray first appeared in the area of the alloca-
tion of judges among districts of a state. Even where there has been a
clear commitment to the popular election of judges, the courts have
refused to apply the one man, one vote principle of Gray and Reynolds:
"[J]udges . . . are not representative in the same sense as are legisla-
tures or the executive. Their function is to administer the law, not to
espouse the cause of a particular constituency."52 This functional dis-
tinction between judges on the one hand and legislators and executives
on the other was combined with the notion of commitment to a popu-
lar election in Sailors v. Board of Education.5' The issue in Sailors was
whether it was permissible for a state which provided for popular elec-
tion of local school boards to provide for the selection of a county
school board by delegates from the local boards, each local board
having one vote despite the population disparity among the local dis-
tricts. The Court held that county board members exercised "admin-
istrative" functions54 and that the system for selecting them was
"basically appointive rather than elective."", Where the state provides
for elected local governments of general legislative powers, the one-
man, one-vote principle is required,50 but "state and local officers of
the non-legislative character involved here may ... be chosen by the
governor, by the legislature, or by some other appointive means rather
than by election." 57 The rationale of the opinion seems to have been
that county board members did not "represent" the local electorate,
date receiving more votes than any other must receive the office unless he Is dis.
qualified on some constitutionally permissible basis or unless, in a runoff or some
other type of election, the people properly and regularly, by their votes, decide
differently.
Id. at 250.
51. 385 U.S. at 233.
52. Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964). Accord, Kail v. Rocke-
feller, 275 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); New York State Association of Trial Lawyers
v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860
(N.D. Ohio 1966).
53. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
54. Id. at 110.
55. Id. at 109.
56. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
57. Sailors v. Bd. of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967).
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since they were "administrators."5s The state's commitment to an elec-
tion was therefore limited to the local board level, and one man, one
vote was not required at higher stages.
Fortson and Sailors are relevant to a state nominating system which
provides for several different stages in the selection of a state conven-
tion. Such a system might provide for the election of delegates by the
rank and file at the precinct level, followed by county conventions of
delegates from the precincts. The county conventions would then select
delegates to the state convention. Where delegates to the state conven-
tion are not apportioned among the counties according to population,
there is a justifiable claim that the votes of party members in the larger
counties have been diluted.
Faced with exactly this situation in Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-
Labor Party,59 a district court and the Eighth Circuit on appeal found
the Reapportionment Cases inapplicable. Relying on an analogy to
Fortson and Sailors, both courts seem to have reasoned that the process
of choosing delegates to the state convention could be divided into two
discrete procedures. At the precinct level came the popular election of
delegates to the county conventions. Here, admittedly, equal protec-
tion required that one man, one vote be observed. At the second level,
the various county conventions selected delegates to the state conven-
tion, which would in turn elect delegates to the national convention.
The party constitution did not require popular participation on this
level; the decision as to county representation at the state convention
rested not with the precinct voters but with the county convention
delegates. The party's choice to apportion state convention votes among
counties on a basis other than population was therefore not the "mal-
apportionment among the people as the electorate" Gt which is forbid-
den by the equal protection clause.
58. Id. at 109 n.6. The Court noted that "[t]here is not even a formal method by
which a delegate can determine the preferences of the people in his district."
59. 287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn. 1968), affd 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968). The Minne-
sota procedure challenged in Irish calls for open precinct caucuses to elect delegates
to county conventions. In turn, the county conventions select delegates to the state
convention with one vote for each 1,000 cast in that county for the leading Democratic-
Farmer-Labor statewide candidate or national Democratic candidate in the last election.
No county receives less than six delegate votes. The plaintiffs in Irish alleged that this
allocation violates the equal protection clause by over-representing the less populous coun-
ties at the state convention.
60. We hold simply that there is nothing of constitutional significance in the alleged
malapportionment here above the precinct caucus level. What was done at tie
precinct level was in full accord with the one man-one vote principle. What took
place thereafter was not the product of malapportionment among the people as the
electorate.. . We do not extend the one man, one vote principle beyond the
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The Irish courts' analysis of the Minnesota procedure failed to recog-
nize that there was but a single continuing procedure for the selection
of the state's delegates to the national convention; the holding of
county conventions to elect the state convention was in no sense an
alternative to selection by precinct representatives. The state was
clearly committed to popular participation in the nominating process,
with convention delegates representing the precinct voters. However,
some of those voters-those from small counties-were given a greater
weight in the convention than others. 6' Fortson, where the majority
found that the choice of a state governor had been taken altogether out
of the hands of the electorate, was therefore inapposite. Once the state
is committed to an electoral method of selection at the base line, it
cannot distort the popular will by introducing unrepresentative pro-
cedures at higher levels of the process.
The district court's reliance on Sailors would appear equally mis-
placed. Sailors emphasized the administrative as opposed to representa-
tive functions of county school boards. County board members were
treated as essentially appointed officials, and the state was granted wide
discretion in choosing an appointive process. In Irish, on the other
hand, the function of the convention delegates was to represent the
will of those who participated in the precinct caucuses. The discretion
granted a state in the choice of administrators would seem inappropri-
ate where the purpose of the procedure is to guarantee that a political
choice is made in accord with the wishes of a particular constituency.02
popular electorate and to decisions of those so properly elected; at least we do not
do so upon the facts present in this case.
399 F.2d at 120.
61. In Dahl v. Republican State Comm., Civil No. 7557 (W.D. Wash. 1968), vacated,
393 U.S. 408 (1969), a statute of the State of Washington provided that the state commit.
tee of a major political party be composed of one committeeman and one committee-
woman from each county. Plaintiffs' claim was that the voters of the four most populous
counties were underrepresented at the state convention, which selected delegates to the
national convention. This complaint was substantially the same as that made in Irish, but
in Dahl the issue was framed as a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the state
statute, rather than as a challenge to the rules of the party. A three-judge court found
that the attack was not on the statue itself, but on the manner in which the party had
exercised the power delegated to it by the staute; hence the court dismissed the action
on the ground that the jurisdictional requirement for a three-judge court had not been
met. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings if plaintiffs
should choose to pursue the matter further.
62. The Supreme Court in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964),
invalidated a legislative apportionment plan which had been ratified in a statewide
popular referendum. To the extent that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Irish held that
only one stage in the process of electing representatives need guarantee one man, one
vote, it would seem to conflict with Lucas as well as other reapportionment cases. Cf.
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481 n.6 (1968). If Fortson and Sailors are inter-
preted as they were in Irish, it would apparently be permissible for a state to elect its
legislature in a two step process, with one man, one vote at the baseline but unequal
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IV.
States where local party officials select the delegates to the state or
national convention, like those where either the governor or state
committee appoints delegates directly, allow no direct popular partici-
pation in the delegate selection process. Although local party officials
may be elected at some time, they are not elected on the specific issue
of the presidential nomination and are often chosen several years
before the national convention, prior to the announcement of any
presidential candidates.63 Procedures of this kind do not lend them-
selves to adjudication under the one man, one vote principle, but they
may nonetheless deny equal protection of the law.
When the individual rights at stake are "fundamental," the Court
has been willing to consider the broad political context in deciding
whether there is a violation of equal protection. 4 The equal protec-
tion clause has been used in voting rights cases to guarantee all citizens
an opportunity to exert an effective influence at a crucial stage of the
elective process.65 A recent comment characterized the Court's decision
in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections00 where Virginia's poll tax was
held unconstitutional, as based on its judgment that
the dilution of voting power is a severe handicap in a democratic
society .... Any restriction on a person's ability to participate in
the political process must be carefully scrutinized in a society
where basic decisions are made and gain acceptability through the
political mechanisms of a representative democracy. 7
Of all the choices the voter makes, it seems clear that that of a Presi-
representation among geographical units in the legislature itself. The result would be the
complete frustration of the policy of Reynolds and Gray.
63. The Hughes Commission study revealed that over 600 delegates to tie 1968
Democratic National Convention were selected by procedures in which there had been
no direct voter participation since 1966. HucHES COMMtsSION, supra note 4. at 24.
64. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Ray. 1065. 1131-32
(1969); and Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 37 U.S.LAV. 4530 (U.S. June 16.
1969), where the Supreme Court invalidated as a violation of equal protection a New
York statute which limited eligibility in school board elections to property owners and
parents of school children. The Court stated that statutes which deny the franchise to
citizens "who are otherwise qualified by residence and age," like those where the effec-
tiveness of the vote is diluted, are not entitled to "the general presumption of constitu-
tionality afforded state statutes," and that "the deference usually given to the judgment
of legislators does not extend to decisions concerning which resident citizens may partici-
pate in the election of legislators and other public officials." Id. at 4531.
If this test is used to evaluate a restrictive classification in a school board election,
and also in a referendum on the issuance of utility revenue bonds, Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 37 U.S.L.W. 4598 (U.S. June 16, 1969), it would appear that a similar standard
should apply to restrictive classifications in delegate selection procedures.
65. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring).
66. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
67. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 83 HAsv. L. R v. 1065, 1129 (1969).
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dent is the most important. There is no question that every state is
committed to the idea that this choice be made through the electoral
process. 8 The issue here is whether a state may structure the electoral
process in such a way that the voters are denied any participation at
the nomination stage-that is, whether rank and file party members
may be classified as non-participants in the delegate selection process.
That the nomination process of the major parties is of fundamental
importance in determining who will be President is a commonplace.
As Justice Pitney put it, "the likelihood of a candidate succeeding in
an election without a party nomination is practically negligible ....
As a practical matter, the ultimate choice of the mass of voters is pre-
determined when the nominations have been made."09 The campaigns
for the major party nominations in 1964 and 1968 underlined the fact
that where party members do not participate at the base line in the
nominating process, the party machinery of a state may endorse candi-
dates who have only minority support among the rank and file.70
The result of voter impotence at this stage may be that on election
day very large numbers of citizens are confronted with two candidates
neither of whom represents their preferences, with the result that they
are unable adequately to express themselves through the electoral
process.
The Supreme Court has recognized that where the nomination
process is an extremely important part of the electoral system as a
whole, the individual voter has a constitutionally protected interest
in participation. Thus where nomination is by primary, blacks may
not be excluded even though they have the right to vote in the final
election. 71 And where a formal primary system has been replaced by
an informal poll involving minimal state action, the equal protection
clause forbids the exclusion of minorities.7 2 Gray and the Reapportion-
ment Cases make it clear that what is at stake here is more than a
policy against racial discrimination. The denial to the voter of an
effective voice at the locus of effective decision-making is equally
impermissible whether based on sex, color, wealth, occupation, or geo-
68. See U.S. SENATE, NOMINATION AND ELEcriON OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 157-62 (1968).
69. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 285-86 (1921) (Pitney, J., concurring
in part).
70. See Note, The Presidential Nomination: Equal Protection at the Grassroots, 42
S. CAL. L. REv. 169, 175-76 (1968).
71. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
72. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir.
1949).
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graphic area.73 The principle uin. trlying all these decisions seems to
be that a state may not create or tolerate a political structure which
gives any group in the electorate disproportionate weight in influencing
the outcome of vital political decisions. This principle is directly ap-
plicable to the dosed convention situation.
The mere fact that the nomination process has been taken away from
the voters and placed in the hands of a small group of party officials
does not, of course, make it any less important an element in the final
outcome. And the fact that the great majority, rather than an arbi-
trarily selected minority, are deprived of an effective say does not make
the deprivation any less severe.
7 4 If there were no legitimate interest
on the side of the dosed convention system, it would be a clearly arbi-
trary classification75 and therefore a violation of equal protection to
allow the mass of party members no voice at all in delegate selection.
The basic argument in favor of the closed convention system is that
state party organizations are best able to achieve their goals when they
are free to allocate power over the nomination process in the manner
73. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIX (sex); amend. XV (color); Harper v. Virginia 
Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) 
(occupa-
tion); Gray v. Sanders, 572 US. 368, 379 (1963) (geography).
Indeed, the Reapportionment Cases have established an easier standard of 
proof for
area discrimination cases than for race discrimination. In Wright v. 
Rockefeller,
76 U.S. 52 (1964), where a New York congressional apportionment statute 
mas under
challenge as racally discriminatory, the Court found against plaintiffs on the 
ground
that they failed to meet their burden of proof in showing racial 
motivation in the
drawing of district lines. Contrast this with the area.discrimination cases 
where, for
example, in Swann v. Adams, 385 US. 440 (1967), the Supreme Court reversed a district
court on the ground that neither the lower court nor the 
state had ustified the polpu.
lation variances among districts. Cf. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U1. 2. 5 
72-73 (1964)
(Goldberg, ., dissenting). See also Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 20 (1967); Steel, Nine Mfen
in Black Who Think White, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1968 (Magazine), at 122.. Compare 
Smith
v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (..Ala. 1966), afj'd, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967) and 
United
States v. Democratic Exec. Comm., 288 F. Supp. 943 (M.D. Ala. 1968) 
with Dusch v. Davis.
387 U.S. 112 (1967) and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
74. Cf. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 37 U.S.L.W. 4598 (U.S. June 16, 1969). 
where the
Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana statute which gave only property 
taxpayers the
right to vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municpal
utility. The result of the classification was that only 40% of the city's registered 
voters--
those who were property taxpayers--could vote in the utility bond election, 
even thouh
the revenue bonds were to be paid only from the operations of the utilities and 
not in
any way from property tax revenue. That the classification excluded 60% of the 
reg-
istered voters did not prevent the Court from finding it arbitrary and therefore 
a vio-
lation of equal protection. And cf. Pierce v. Village of Ossiring, 292 F. 
Supp. 113
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), where a three-judge court invalidated a New York 
statute which would
have disqualified 55% of the village's voters in an election to decide whether 
to change
the form of government from a mayoral to a village manager system.
75. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Court stated that
"where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection 
Clau
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized 
and care-
fully confined." Id. at 670. The Virginia poll tax was invalid 
because "wrealth ...
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which seems to them most appropriate. It may also be felt that control
by local party officials is desirable because it is they who are best able
to achieve continuity and compromise, both important to a strong
party structure.76  In essence, then, the constitutional question is
whether at the nomination stage the interest in autonomy and stability
of political parties77 outweighs the interest in effective voter participa-
tion in decision-making7 8
A decision of this kind cannot be made without examining the larger
political context. In a political culture based on widespread and in-
tense grass roots participation, where local officials are in close contact
with and highly responsive to the mass of their constituents, a very
high degree of internal party autonomy may be appropriate. Likewise,
when the absence of national mass communication and transportation
systems makes it difficult for rank and file party members to evaluate
national political figures and issues, heavy reliance on local party offi-
cials as intermediaries and consensus builders may be justified. 0 On
the other hand, when an informed national electorate exists and local
political mechanisms no longer effectively organize the vote, the re-
76. See generally A. SINDLER, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1966). Sindler
elsewhere defines the reason for maintaining party government as "the recognition that
organized and enduring parties, when placed in a competitive relationship in their pur-
suit of political power, are better able than shifting factions, interest groups, or other
rivals to perform a number of functions critical to the successful operation of constitu.
tional government." Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to "Sear the Conscience" of Legislators,
72 YALE L.J. 23, 28 n.14 (1962). This goal, he contends, may be inconsistent with a high
degree of intra-party democracy if the dual objectives of strict party discipline and
ideological moderation are sought. POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES, supra,
at 92 n.1, 94-98.
77. In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized a legiti.
mate state interest in the maintenance of a strong two-party system so that the election
winner be the choice of a majority of the voters. Another function of the two-party
system was recognized by Polsby and Wildavsky: "The voter who follows his party
identification . . . can vastly simpify the choices he must make and thus reduce to
manageable proportions the amount of time he spends on public affairs." PoLsny &
WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 16 (2d ed. 1968). And further, "party identification
for most people provides the safe cognitive anchorage around which political prefer.
ences are organized. Set adrift from this anchorage . . . most voters have little or nothing
to guide their choices." Id. at 231. See also A. SINoLsR, FOLITICAL PARTIES IN TIlE UNITED
STATES 88-90 (1966). The widely-claimed interests in strong two-party government, how.
ever, are nowhere said by these commentators to be served by exclusive control of nomi-
nation procedures by party professionals. Indeed, the experience of the 1968 Democratic
National Convention would seem to indicate the opposite conclusion.
78. In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 37 U.S.L.W. 4530 (U.S. June
16, 1969), the Supreme Court used a two-stage test. First, does the purported state in-
terest require the restriction, and if so does it "accomplish this purpose with sufficient
precision to justify denying appellant the franchise?" Id. at 4533. And second, if the ex-
clusion is necessary to promote the articulated state interest, is that interest a compelling
one? Id. n.14.
79. See Note, The Presidential Nomination: Equal Protection at the Grass roots, 42
S. CAL. L. REv. 169, 174 (1968).
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tention of exclusive control over nominations by unresponsive local
officials is no longer functionally justified.
The Court must also take into account the evolution of ideas con-
cerning the nature of representative government. At a time when it
was felt to be permissible within a democratic framework to restrict
the suffrage to male property holders and systematically to exclude
sizeable groups on the basis of race, a system of excluding voters from
participation in the nomination process might have been perfectly
consistent with national norms. But in 1969, the power of party bureau-
crats to disregard popular sentiment is an anomaly.
Over the last century, five constitutional amendments have directly
extended the franchise.8 0 Although legislatures and political parties
have had a major role in this "inclusion process," the Supreme Court
has consistently accepted responsibility for guaranteeing minimum
standards of participation.8' Thus the Court in Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections82 struck down a state poll tax law even though the recently
passed twenty-fourth amendment had been limited to federal elec-
tions.s8
In two of the most recent voting rights cases under the equal pro-
tection clause-Williams v. Rhodess
4 and Moore v. Ogilvies 8-the
Supreme Court has, in effect, made it significantly easier for dissidents
within the major parties to split off and gain third party status. In
Rhodes, the Court struck down Ohio's regulations governing access
of third parties to a place on the ballot, and in Ogilvie an Illinois re-
quirement that new third parties obtain at least 200 signatures from
80. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, (denial of vote on account of race forbidden); amend. XVII
(popular election of United States senators); amend. XIX (denial of vote on account of sex
forbidden); amend. XXII (right to vote in presidential elections extended to District
of Columbia residents); amend. XXIV (outlawing poll tax in federal elections and pri.
maries).
81. Even though expansion of the electorate has generally received bi-partisan en-
dorsement, "the parties are not equipped to handle completely the adjustment of rights
and demands which must accompany the 'inclusion process.' Courts become involved
as well. Their role has been to oversee the definition and realization of the rights of polit-
ical participation ... " Claude, Nationalization of the Electoral Process, 6 HAnv. J. Ixets.
139, 145 (1969).
82. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
83. in Harper justice Black objected that the Supreme Court had previously 
up-
held state poll taxes. justice Douglas' response was that
the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.
in determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted
due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time dtemed to be the
limits of fundamental rights... . Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.
id. at 669
84. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
85. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
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each of 50 counties in order to appear on the ballot was found to
violate the equal protection clause.86 The underlying rationale of
these decisions is that "the advancement of political goals means little
if a party can be kept off the election ballots and thus denied an equal
opportunity to win votes. '87 In Rhodes, the Court noted that the
"right of qualified voters . . . to cast their votes effectively" ranks
among our "most precious freedoms." 88
The challenge to closed convention nominating procedures is an
attempt to assert the same kinds of interests constitutionally safe-
guarded by the Court in Rhodes and Ogilvie. Dissidents within the
major parties, like the new party advocates, seek to "make themselves
heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision,"8 but come up
against party structures which deny them any participation at all.9o
86. The statute struck down in Ogilvie had been upheld in MacDougall v. Green,
355 U.S. 281 (1948).
87. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
88. Id. at 30. There was also a first amendment element to the decision in Rhodes,Justice Black's majority opinion emphasized both the interest in effective voting and the
interest in freedom of political association, while Justice Harlan's concurrence was based
exclusively on the first amendment. Justice Douglas' separate opinion emphasized the
right of association, and he relied on the first amendment aspect of the case In Ills
opinion in Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969), where black candidates were kept offthe ballot in an Alabama county election. Consequently, it might be argued that althoughthe interests protected in Rhodes were similar to those asserted by the intra-party dissi-
dents, the case would have been decided differently had there not been a first amendment
element.
However, while it is true that Justice Black's opinion does not rely on the Re-apportionment Cases, the equal protection ground seems to have been at least as Im-portant as the first amendment element of the case. When the Supreme Court in Moorev. Ogilvie was faced with Illinois' requirement that electors obtain 200 signatures In
at least 50 counties to appear on the ballot, the Court found that the requirement vlo.
lated equal protection. Justice Douglas' opinion for the majority overruled MacDougallv. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), which had upheld identical restrictions, explicitly on the
ground that the earlier case had been rendered obsolete by the one man, one vote
decisions. The Court thus dearly indicated that there is a constitutionally protected in-terest in access to the ballot as an effective means for exerting influence on the polit-
ical process, even where first amendment guarantees are not brought into play.
First amendment considerations might be thought to militate against judicial inter-
vention in the nominating procedures of political parties. However, for the major parties,
where state action is dearly involved, the notion that "private" political organizations
can deny their members equal protection was rejected as early as Smith v. Allwright, 321U.S. 715 (1944). See p. 1234 supra. The first amendment argument for autonomy may be
stronger in the case of small parties which have little chance of success in national elec.
tons. One approach the Court could adopt in this area would be to classify political par-ties as "major" or "minor." Once a group attained majorparty status, the limitations advo-
cated in this Note would apply, but independent candidates and small or ad hoc partieswould be held to a less rigorous standard of equal protection in internal nominating
procedures. In each case, the Court would balance the interest in equal participation by
small party members against the interest in allowing minorities in national political
campaigns to come together rapidly and effectively in third parties.
89. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 137 (1956).
90. In order to achieve fundamental party democracy, the Hughes Commission out.
lines the following basic principles:
I. Access. Voters must have realistic and meaningful access to the process of select-
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For the Supreme Court to protect the interest in participation when it
is put forward outside the traditional framework of American politics,
but to disregard it when asserted at the centers of power within the
major parties, would be both logically inconsistent and potentially at
odds with the stability of the two-party system.
If the interest at stake is effective political participation, the guaran-
tee of a place on the ballot to third or even fourth parties is far less
important than a guarantee of democratic procedures in the major
party nominating process. As Duverger, discussing the role of political
parties within the democratic process, observes, "the legal monopoly
of parties is generally less important than the actual monopoly; no
purpose is served by leaving complete liberty to non-party candidates
if normally only party candidates have any chance of success."
01 So
long as the plurality candidate wins a state's entire allotment of elec-
toral votes,92 it is unrealistic to expect that the expanded right to a
place on the ballot will prove an effective political weapon. For the
foreseeable future, groups which wish to influence the actual choice
of a President must continue to rely on intra-party procedures as their
major vehicle.
Of course the current bias in the American political system in favor
of the two-party system is no accident. While deciding in favor of the
third party advocates, Justice Black's majority opinion in Rhodes ex-
plicitly recognized a legitimate state interest "in attempting to see that
the election winner be the choice of a majority of its voters.
'0 3 To the
extent that minority parties increase the likelihpod that a President
ing delegates.... They must be able to participate in local caucuses or to ascertan
the preferences of the delegate-candidates on the primary ballot.
2. Clarity of Purpose. Delegates selected in statewide primaries, or participants in
state conventions assembled for the purpose of selecting delegates, should be chosen
by the people solely on the basis of their views on national issues, and their pre-
ferences with respect to the pending presidential nomination.
S. Timing. Delegates, or those who select them, should be elected by the people at a
time which is reasonably proximate to the . . . National Convention ... no earlier
than six months before the convention.
4. Fair Apportionment. It is inherently unfair to give more weight to the votes of one
area of a state than those cast in other areas.
5. Fair Representation of Voter Preferences .... If applied without qualification
across the nation, the majority rule principle might seriously distort the tenor of
popular preferences in the composition of the National Convention. Obstacles to the
representation of minority preferences, such as the unit rule, should therefore be
eliminated from all levels of the delegate selection process.
HUGHES COMMISSION 18-19.
91. DuvEGEP, PoLrrmcAL PATIrs 355 (1955).
92. The Supreme Court recently upheld the winner-take-all aspect of awarding a
state's votes in the electoral college. Williams v. Virginia St. Bd. of Elections, 288 F. Supp.
622 (1968), aff'd, 393 US. 820 (1969). See also Deleware v. New York, 885 U.S. 895, rehear-
ing denied, 385 US. 964 (1966); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 US. 1 (1892).
953. 59 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
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will be elected with a minority of the popular vote, they undercut the
representativeness of the only office in the nation for which all Ameri-
cans vote. It is certainly not unreasonable to say that sound public
policy dictates that the President represent a broad base of popular
support. This implies that it is wise to encourage coalition-forming at
an earlier stage in the electoral process than the election itself.Y" Tradi-
tionally, intra-party conflict has served exactly this purpose. The role
of the major parties was well characterized by the district court in
Irish:
[A] primary function of a political party in a democracy is the di-
rection and control of the struggle for political power among men
who may have contradictory interests and often mutually exclusive
hopes of securing them. This the parties do by institutionalizing
the struggle and emphasizing positive measures to create a strong
and general agreement on policies.95
In Rhodes and Ogilvie, the interest in the preservation of the two
party system was outweighed by the interest of individuals in effective
participation in the electoral process. If the courts refuse to protect this
same interest in participation when it is asserted by those working
within the major parties, they will encourage the formation of third
parties as the preferred strategy for minorities attempting to influence
the composition of the presidential ballot. This destabilizing effect can
be avoided if the courts accord equal weight to individual rights
whether exercised within or without the major parties. The essence of
the equal protection argument against closed conventions is thus that
in a political system which places the greatest emphasis on openness
and inclusiveness, it is simply inconsistent to permit a state to exclude
the great mass of voters from one of the most important of the tradi-
tional mechanisms of political expression.
94. See A. BICKEL, THE NEW AGE OF PoLrrMAL RFxORM, 231-33 (1968).
95. 287 F. Supp. 794, 805 (1968).
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